The Quebec sovereignty movement suffered a severe blow last week. After six consecutive successful elections, the Bloc Québécois was virtually wiped out.
Just a month ago, many sovereignists saw in Gilles Duceppe and his disciplined troops a catalyst for their cause. Now Duceppe is gone after a lacklustre campaign and the Bloc may well be finished as a political player in Quebec.
To many Canadians, this can only mean that the idea of sovereignty is dead.
In fact, the fundamentals that drive support for sovereignty may not have changed much, although the implications of the election make predicting the course of events trickier than ever.
Recent polls on support for sovereignty in Quebec suggest a stable level of about 40 per cent, just below where it was before the 1995 referendum campaign. But behind that collective stability, individual positions are less stable. Between the dyed-in-the-wool separatists and unwaveringly patriotic Canadians, there is a vast middle ground of Quebecers who may, under certain conditions, opt for either option.
Understanding how they make up their minds can help us anticipate how the politics of sovereignty might unfold in the wake of last week’s BQ debacle.
There are three key factors: core values, including national identity; a more or less explicit cost-benefit analysis of federalism versus sovereignty; and the context in which individuals make up their mind as they ponder that big choice.
On the question of whether Quebecers identify primarily with Quebec or with , the long-term trend has been toward the former. This trend has been accelerated by generational change as fewer young Quebecers than ever identify — either primarily or equally — with Canada.
For example, last December a Léger Marketing poll found that 60 per cent of all Quebecers identified primarily or exclusively with Quebec, up from measures of 45 to 50 per cent in the late 1990s.
Interestingly, a Léger poll conducted immediately after the election that saw Quebec jump into the arms of the NDP showed virtually no change in the level of attachment to Canada in the province.
Predispositions also rest on core social values. Quebec is Canada’s most left-leaning province. If Stephen Harper gives in to the demands of backbench social conservatives, who make no secret of their wish to redefine “Canadian values,” the emerging new Canadian identity could become unpalatable to large segments of the Quebec population.
On issues related to religion, gun control, criminal justice, same-sex unions and other values, there is a rift between opinion in Quebec and the rest of Canada. There are also persistent differences between Quebec’s opinions on military policy and the Tories’ more interventionist propensities.
On the whole, federalists might hope that the election results could bring Canadians and Quebecers closer together, but Léger’s post-election poll shows that 60 per cent of Quebecers do not believe that proposition.
Identity and values are a key starting point, but Quebecers are a calculating bunch and their choice depends on evaluations of the respective costs and benefits of sovereignty and federalism.
Aside from balancing the cultural-linguistic promises of sovereignty against its potential economic costs, Quebecers are also keenly sensitive to the possibility of political gains or losses within federalism, especially with regard to policy autonomy for their provincial government and a formal recognition of Quebec’s distinct character.
On this account, the election sends mixed messages. The NDP attracted Quebec voters with a promise of creating elusive “winning conditions for Quebec in Canada,” which may lead some “soft nationalists” to give Canada another chance.
But the NDP is in no position to fulfill these expectations, and with little Quebec representation in the Harper cabinet, the stage has been set for renewed disillusionment with federalism.
All these factors seem to suggest the election could lead to a strengthening rather than a weakening of the idea of sovereignty, but a strong idea is not enough.
Ultimately, political success must be earned at the ballot box, which takes leaders able to win elections and then clear the huge hurdle of a referendum vote.
There is little doubt that Pauline Marois and the Parti Québécois are in a good position to defeat Jean Charest’s Liberals in the next election but, following the defeat of Duceppe and the Bloc, the gaping hole in the sovereignty movement’s leadership makes the next step — a referendum victory — a more elusive goal.
Finally, the federal election offers a cautionary tale that the PQ would ignore at its peril: Given the yearning for change of a highly volatile Quebec electorate, sovereignists cannot dismiss the scenario of a hastily put-together third party suddenly pulling the rug from under their feet.
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Pierre Martin is a professor of political science at the Université de Montréal.