1 INTRODUCTION

According to the Wiley‐Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization, mass migration “differs from individual migration in the sheer numbers of people involved.” Three major periods of mass migration can be identified; the first period where European migration to the new world followed Christopher Columbus discovery of the Americas; the second linked to the Industrial Revolution where a new wave of European migration to the Americas occurred; and the last period of migration in the post 1965 era, characterized by immigration from less industrialized countries to more industrialized countries (Pok, 2012).

The current era of mass migration from third world countries to developed nations is an interesting subject for demographers; it is a politically hot topic. Few demographers have asked what the long‐term impact of the current period of mass migration will be on host countries' ethnic composition. One of them, Professor David Coleman of Oxford University, had published extensively on the subject (Coleman, 2002; Coleman, 2003; Coleman, 2006a; Coleman, 2006b; Coleman, 2007; Coleman, 2008; Coleman, 2009; Coleman, 2010; Coleman, Compton, & John, 2002); his research focuses on western European countries and puts a particular emphasis on the United Kingdom. Coleman stated that “most academic discussion of migration concentrates upon its effects on the economy, labour force and ‘race relations’. Less attention is paid to the effects on total population: its size, structure and its ethnic or national composition” (Coleman, 2003). In his literature review, he highlighted the fact that 15% to 30% of the population of western European countries will be represented by first‐ and second‐generation immigrants (Coleman, 2008) by the mid‐21st century; his projection predicted that the White British population would fall to below 56% of the United Kingdom's population in 2056 (Coleman, 2010). In France, the demographer Michèle Tribalat estimated, for the year 1999, that 24% of France population aged between 1 and 60 years old were first‐, second‐, or third‐generation immigrants (Tribalat, 2004); according to the author, this would be the highest rate in Europe.

In 2015, Tribalat updated her analysis with the 2011 French census where the French definition of the term “foreign origin” changed which yielded results easier to compare with other European countries; she estimated for the year 2011 that first‐ and second‐generation immigrants comprised 19.2% of France's total population while the first, second, and third generation made up 30% of the total. The author also highlighted that the definition of “foreign origin” has an important impact on the results; for example, Norway's foreign origin population of 2011 would be 12.2% according to Denmark's definition while it would be 17.2% according to the Netherlands' definition. Using national statistics institutes, Tribalat calculated for the first‐ and second‐generation immigrants' share of the population of Sweden, France, Austria, Netherland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, England, and Belgium in 2011 and obtained, respectively, 26.0%, 19.2%, 18.7%, 21.1%, 17.2%, 10.1%, 18.5, 19.5%, 20.2%, and 24.2% for these countries (Tribalat, 2015). Another study concluded that people who migrated to Europe after 2004 and their descendants will represent more than half of the population at childbearing age by 2054 in some European countries (Ediev, Coleman, & Scherbov, 2014). In the United States, the Pew Research Center tabulated data from the American decennial census of 1960, 1985, 2001, and 2017 and concluded that the boomer generation, when they were aged 21 to 36 years old, were 75% white, while the millennium generation, when compared at the same age, were 56% white, which highlights the fact that mass migration, mainly from Mexico, is changing the ethnic composition of the American population (Pew Research Center, 2018). Smith and Edmontson showed that non‐Hispanic whites made up 83% of the U.S. population in 1970; their projections predicted that this group would fall to 51% in 2050 (Smith & Edmonston, 1997).

Canada, a confederation of provinces created in 1867, traces its origins to the colonization of the shores of the St‐Lawrence River by French settlers between 1608 and 1760. Then, after the British conquest, immigrants from the British Isles settled in the colony. Immigration to Canada originated almost exclusively from Europe until the 1960's when immigration restrictions based on country of origin were lifted. By 1970, most recent immigrants were non‐European; in 1971, Canada proclaimed multiculturalism to be its integration policy (Reitz, 2012; Statistics Canada, 2016). Canada being amongst the countries receiving the most immigrants per capita (Chagnon 2013), it is expected to experience a marked shift in its ethnic background during the 21th century. According to an official projection, by 2036, between 44.2% and 49.7% of Canadians will be first‐generation and second‐generation immigrants, and between 82.2% and 84.6% of these first‐ or second‐generation immigrants will be of non‐European origin (Morency, Malenfant, & MacIsaac, 2017). If the developed world's ethnic background is going to change significantly during the current century, then, thanks to its high migration level, Canada will be the amongst the first in which this will occur. Thus, Canada can be considered a live laboratory to study the impact of mass migration on a country's ethnic background.

Within Canada, the French Canadians, an ethnic minority in Canada, have had a long history of struggling to preserve their cultural identity and language. For example, after the Rebellion of 1837–1838, the British Crown had sent Lord Durham to investigate the causes of the rebellion; one of Durham's recommendation in his report, “Report on the Affairs of British North America” (Lambton, 1839), was to assimilate the French Canadians to the British culture by increasing immigration from Great Britain to Canada; although British immigration to Canada was high, French Canadians' elevated total fertility rate (TFR) prevented their demographic marginalization and subsequent assimilation. The French Canadians, whose origins lie in the colonization of New France (Vézina, Tremblay, Desjardins, & Houde, 2005), had maintained a status of ethnic majority in the Province of Quebec since the British's conquest. The study of the evolution of the ethnic French Canadian (EFC) population, which is facing low fertility at the same time as its Quebec base has a high immigration rate, makes an interesting case study for the observation of the impact of mass migration on local ethnic groups' demographic weight (DW). As a matter of perspective, in 2016, there were 84,642 births in Quebec compared to 52,205 newly arrived immigrants (Statistics Canada, 2019); these two figures alone should give an insight into a predictable future. Note that the term demographic weight (DW) as used here describes an ethnic group's share of a territory (in this case, Quebec's) total population.

This could have multiple social implications in the province of Quebec, one of them being the hot topic of language policy. As the DW of immigrants increases in the province, one may wonder, what will happen to the French language in Quebec? The fact that Quebec's population of about 8 million is approximately 80% francophone (French mother tongue) and surrounded by about 350 million anglophones located in other Canadian provinces and the United States is important. Thus, immigrants entering Quebec may well assimilate to the English language, particularly in Montreal, the provincial metropole. The linguistic question is a central theme in Quebec politics since the province's parliament passed laws concerning the use of the French language in the workplace, in education, and in public spaces (Woolfson, 1983; Hamers & Hummel, 1994; Termote, 2015; Bilodeau, 2016; Kircher 2016; Bourhis & Sioufi, 2017). The use of French is strongly influenced by the DW of the EFC (Maheu, 1973) as well as the assimilation of immigrants to the French language (Ouellette, 2011).

The main objective of this study is to evaluate the impact of immigration on the EFC DW. This main objective obviously includes the following questions. Are the EFC converging toward a minority status? If yes, when and at what rate? As of today, what portion of the Quebec population is represented by EFC? What was the past impact of immigration on EFC representativeness? On the quantitative level, how do we define mass immigration? Answers to these questions will have multiple social implications, including the preservation of the French language in Quebec.

Regarding the EFC share in the province, as absurd as it may seem, this has not been enumerated for the past 50 years. Recent census data cannot be used to determine the EFC DW since French Canadians can identify themselves as Quebecers, French, Canadians, or French Canadians; other ethnic groups would also identify as Quebecers, French, or Canadian; moreover, individuals can identify with more than one ethnic category (Statistics Canada, 2006). And the linguistic approach cannot be used to indirectly determine EFC DW either since 48% of all immigrants have adopted French (Castonguay, 1997) including 40% for first‐generation allophone (non‐English, non‐French) immigrants (Castonguay, 2002) and 61% for second‐generation allophone immigrants (Bélanger, Sabourin, & Lachapelle, 2011). The most reliable data dates from the 1971 census where the ethnic origin question was answered based on firm choices rather than from self‐identification as found in later censuses. In parallel, ethnic‐based demography was still common in the 1970s. The demographer Robert Maheu discussed the future of linguistic groups in Quebec, underlining the fact that the French language legacy was closely link to the proportion of EFC. Maheu showed that, in 1971, the EFC made up 79.0% of Quebec's population while 80.7% of Quebecers spoke French (Maheu, 1973). However, not long after, demographers shifted their attention to linguistic demography (Duchesne, 1980; Lachapelle & Henripin, 1980; Paillé, 2011; Robitaille, Bourbeau, Girard, & Tremblay, 1992; Termote, 2001).

Regarding the fate of the EFC majority in the province, the closest answer to this question was obtained in 1987 when the demographer Jacques Henripin projected the DW of the descendants of Quebecers of 1981 for the year 2081 (Henripin & Pelletier, 1986; Henripin & Pelletier, 1987). Henripin concluded that if the TFR of Quebecers was maintained at 1.6 and if immigration was used to prevent Quebec's population decline, 24% of Quebecers of 2081 would descend from Quebecers of 1981 while the balance, 76%, would be from immigrant sources. Henripin did not focus on the EFC as he took the entire population of Quebec of 1981 (EFC and non‐EFC), which he compared with the post‐1981 immigrants to examine the relative weight of each in the 2081 population. The current study goes beyond Henripin's by investigating the past impact of immigration on the EFC DW, from 1971 to 2014, which was impossible at the time of Henripin; then, it focuses strictly on the demographic evolution of the French Canadian ethnic group, a subject which has not been studied for the last 50 years.

2 METHOD

3.1 I—Demographic evolution from 1971 to 2014

From 1971 to 2014, it is observed that the EFCs population of Quebec had increased by 0.25% per year from 4.76 to 5.31 million individuals while the total Quebec population's growth was 0.7% per year from 6.03 to 8.21 million people. During these years, it is observed that the EFC DW decreased from 79% in 1971 to 64.5% in 2014 (Figure 3). Immigrants arriving after 1971 and their descendants (IAD) added 1.62 million individuals to Quebec's population and are responsible for 74% of Quebec's population increase during this period. This is higher than what was observed in France and the United Kingdom; immigration to France was responsible for 40% of the population increase from 1950 to 1986 (Tribalat, Garson, Moulier‐Boutang, & Silberman, 1991) in the United Kingdom, immigration accounted for 30% of the total population growth from 1951 to 1995 (Coleman et al., 2002). In short, from 1971 to 2014, EFC's reduced rate of population growth and the high IAD immigration rate are mainly responsible for the EFC DW decrease.

4.1 I—Comparison to the literature

In 1987, Jacques Henripin concluded that 24% of the ancestry of Quebecers of 2081 would come from Quebecers of 1981 while the balance would be from immigrant sources (Henripin & Pelletier, 1986; Henripin & Pelletier, 1987). His analyses are based on a TFR of 1.6 and on two immigration scenarios, the first where immigration is used to stabilize Quebec's population and the second where it is used to increase population by 1%. In Figure 4 of his 1987 article, it is observed that, under both scenarios, 50% of the ancestry of Quebecers of 2050 comes from Quebecers of 1981. Cross validating with the results of the present study, it can be assumed that 76% of Quebec population of 1981 were EFCs; thus, the EFCs would become a minority in Henripin's study when the ancestry of Quebecers of 1981 represents 65% of future Quebecers' ancestry. Therefore, in Henripin's study, the EFCs become a minority in 2030 according to the 1% population growth scenario and in 2040 according to the stable population scenario. Surprisingly, using a much simpler method, Henripin arrived at conclusions close to those of the current study. The current method is calibrated with data from the past 44 years and used literature and census data published since 1970, most of which were not available at the time of Henripin's study.

On the international level, DW decline of the EFC can be compared to non‐Hispanic white American decline in the United States and to White British decline in the United Kingdom (see Table 4). The EFCs' DW trend is similar to the non‐Hispanic white American trend until the year 2030 when the EFC share begins to decline more quickly; this could be due to its comparatively lower TFR, faster immigration, or to methodology. The EFCs reach minority status at approximately the same time as other groups studied: 2040 for the non‐Hispanic white Americans according to Ortman and Guarneri (2009), 2042 for the EFCs according to the present study, and 2066 for the white British in United Kingdom—when extrapolating data from Coleman (2010). However, since the non‐Hispanic white American and White British absolute populations benefit numerically from white immigration, which is not the case for the (ancestrally defined) EFCs, the comparison is imperfect.

• ^a From 1971 Canada's census.


• ^b From the current study.


• ^c From Smith and Edmonston (1997).


• ^d From U.S. national projection in Ortman and Guarneri (2009).


• ^e Estimated from Figure 2 from Coleman (2010).

It would be interesting to extend the comparison to other countries, such as France, for example. However, many demographers focus on the representativeness of immigrants or on individuals of foreign origin rather than on native ethnic groups. It is possible to compare immigrants' DW to other studies; however, such comparisons are rather difficult and risky since definition of terms and methodology have a major impact on results. Nevertheless, limited comparisons can be made. IAD would make up 20% of Quebec's population in 2014. This can be compared to France, where in 2011, first‐ and second‐generation immigrants will make up 19.2% of the population or 30% when including the third generation (Tribalat, 2015). In Canada, official statistics predict that first‐ and second‐generation immigrants will represent between 44% and 50% of the Canadian population in 2036 (Morency et al., 2017), while in the current study, immigrants and their descendants arrived after 1971 would represent 34% of Quebec's population. Differences between Quebec and Canada can be explained by two main factors. First, Quebec receives proportionally fewer immigrants than other Canadian provinces. In addition, definitions are not the same. For instance, second‐generation immigrants from Statistics Canada also includes individuals born from intermarriage; this depresses the Canadian‐born share by boosting the second‐generation immigrant share.

4.2 II—Potential implications

The results demonstrate that the province of Quebec is projected to reach “majority‐minority” status before the middle of the current century if immigration remains at its current level. The decline of the EFC majority has political, societal, and philosophical implications. On the political level, one may wonder, what the effect will be on support for Quebec independence? In 1995, Quebecers held a referendum to separate Quebec from Canada which resulted in a 49.4% vote for independence. Sixty percent of francophones supported independence while 95% of non‐francophones opposed it (Beauchemin, 1998). This can be compared to Northern Ireland Protestants who almost unanimously oppose Irish reunification while Catholics are divided on the question (Ipso Mori, 2016). This option, not very popular amongst NFC Quebecers and amongst immigrants, might disappear from the public debate as Quebec's ethnic composition changes—unless immigrants and their descendants demonstrate growing support. Nevertheless, Lavoie and Serre in 2002 showed that support for independence is still highly variable for immigrants according to their degree of assimilation to the francophone group. The Parti Québécois, the main political party advocating support for independence, may find it difficult to win votes by promoting independence in the near future. Its traditional opponent, the Parti Liberal, has been using independence as a scarecrow to gain votes from opponents to Quebec independence (Noel, 2014).

Regarding the language question, one may wonder how the French Canadian culture and language can be effectively transmitted to newcomers as the EFC share falls. As of 2011, 86.8% of Quebec's immigrants reside in the Montreal Metropolitan census region (Government of Quebec, 2014), similar to Canada as a whole, where 90.9% of all immigrants live in census metropolitan areas (Morency et al., 2017). At the same time, French Canadians are leaving the city for the suburbs. Thus, in the long run, French Canadian culture in Montreal will have to be transmitted from older generations of immigrants and their descendants to freshly arrived immigrants. One may ask if this is feasible. What amount of effort must be done to preserve the French language? Do Quebecers, who are becoming more and more multicultural and multiethnic, want to preserve a French Canadian identity and language or do they accept the possibility that in the long run they might assimilate to the English language and to Anglo‐American culture such as the Cajuns of Louisiana? Over the past 40 years, Quebec's language policies have been a success in preserving French as the official and dominant language (Hamers & Hummel, 1994, Bourhis & Sioufi, 2017), but not without causing friction with the English‐speaking community (Woolfson, 1983) and even an exodus (Maheu, 1983; Pettinicchio, 2012). In this period, measures have been implemented to favour immigrants from French‐speaking countries as a means of sustaining the French language.

In 1971 (Statistics Canada, 1974b), Quebecers born abroad came from Italy (19.3%), the United Kingdom (14.0%), United States (9.9%), France (7.1%), and Greece (5.6%), which contrasts sharply with today immigrations sources. The top countries amongst Quebec immigrants between 2011 and 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2017) were France (9.3%), Haiti (7.8%), Algeria (7.6%), Morocco (6.3%), and China (5.0%). As such, the ethnic composition of Quebec's recent immigrants diverges significantly from the rest of Canada: between 2011 and 2016, Asia provided 61.8% of Canada's immigrants, while Africa provided 34.5% of Quebec's (Statistics Canada, 2017). Thus, before 1966, 8% of the immigrants were francotrope (more affinity toward the French language), rising to 53% between 1971 and 1975 and 57% for the 1986 to 1991 period (Castonguay, 1997). As such, assimilation of immigrants to the French language was 27.4%, 35.8%, and 39.8% for 1971, 1991, and 1996, respectively (Castonguay, 2002). Immigrant selection and political measures effectively increased assimilation to the French language for awhile; however, as demographer Charles Castonguay points out, assimilation trends are about to be reversed as recent censuses demonstrate that more francophone are being assimilated to English than the reverse in Montreal (Castonguay, 2018; Castonguay, 2019). In fact, in this provincial metropolis, it seems that linguistic transfer to English or French is highly dependent on the linguistic character of the neighbourhood where the immigrants decide to settle (Ouellette, 2011). Thus, as the EFCs' DW decreases, immigrant assimilation into French may decrease as well.

Immigration and related questions regarding integration, culture, and religion could become increasingly important in politics. In 2008, the Quebec government held a special commission on “reasonable accommodation” which addressed the issue of religious minorities demanding special requests to accommodate their religion (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008); in 2013, the Parti Quebecois proposed a bill, the Quebec charter of values, which ended up in a heated debate regarding Quebec's relationship with immigrants and religious minorities, particularly the Muslim minority (Bakali, 2015; Nadeau & Helly, 2016). In the 2018 elections, the Coalition Avenir Quebec proposed to temporarily reduce annual immigration from 50,000 to 40,000 until proper means of integration and francisation are implemented. In 2019, the newly elected Quebec government debated a law, Bill 21, regarding the prohibition of religious symbols for certain job positions in the public sector which ignited another heated debate and demonstrated stark polarization between francophones and anglophones. Quebec's growing political interest in the immigration question and topics related to adaptation to rising cultural diversity is a local example of a more global trend where politicians are capitalizing on the immigration issue (Coleman, 2008). In this, Quebecers differ from other Canadians. When compared to the United States, New Zealand, and Australia, Canadians are said to be the most pro‐immigration (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010), and immigration is considered less of an issue for Canadian voters than for the above‐mentioned countries (Kaufmann, 2019). In contrast, as shown in Eric Kaufmann's Whiteshift, Quebecers are the most in favour of immigration reduction when compared to the United States, New Zealand, Australia, and English Canada. Their attitude to immigration and multiculturalism are similar to those in Europe, and the author suggests that opposition to immigration and the rise of right populism is correlated with the rate of majority ethnic decline rather than just being related to the rise of specific minority groups (Kaufmann, 2019).

It might be asked why anti‐immigrant demonstrations, populism, and tension have been relatively low in Quebec and Canada compared to the United States and Europe, since Canada has much higher immigration rate per capita. A possible answer could be that its immigration system attracts high‐quality immigrants which produce a positive perception of immigration. From 2005 to 2009, 63.3% of all immigrants were admitted in Quebec through the economic immigrant's programme, 22.0% through the family reunification programme, and 12.6% through the refugee programme (Turcotte, 2010). Economic immigrants are selected based on a grid that considers the following: educational qualifications, language competences (French/English), work experience, age, labour market suitability, and adaptability (Government of Canada, 2019). The Canadian immigration system attracts highly educated immigrants: According to the 2000 census, 40% of Canadians citizens holding a masters or a doctoral degree were immigrants. As of 2006, the proportion of recent immigrants with a university diploma was twice as high as amongst Canadian‐born citizens (Galarneau & Morrissette, 2008). This contrasts with the United States where immigrants from Latin America put pressure on the wages of unskilled American workers while on the contrary Canada's educated immigration impacts the wages of the better educated. According to a Canada‐USA‐Mexico study, doctoral and masters degree holders' wages were pulled down by 7% (Aydemir & Borjas, 2006), which narrowed wage inequality in Canada. In terms of labour, recent immigrants (those who have arrived five or fewer years earlier) have a 4.6% higher rate of unemployment than the Canadian‐born, which decreases to 0.6% for immigrants who arrived more than 10 years ago (Yssaad & Field, 2018). It could be argued that selection of quality immigrants facilitates integration and helps Canadians hold a positive view of their immigration system.