OUI à la discrimination positive !

Tribune libre 2010



L'objectif de la loi sur l'équité en matière d'emploi est celui-ci : « La présente loi a pour objet de (...) corriger les désavantages subis, dans le domaine de l'emploi, par les femmes, les autochtones, les personnes handicapées et les personnes qui font partie des minorités visibles (...) ».
Source : http://lois.justice.gc.ca/fr/E-5.40...
En droit international, en droit canadien et en droit français la discrimination positive ne viole pas le principe d'égalité ! :
En droit international :
Le Comité des droits de l'homme affirmait en 1989 : « Le Comité fait également observer que l'application du principe d'égalité suppose parfois de la part des Etats parties l'adoption de mesures en faveur de groupes désavantagés, visant à atténuer ou à supprimer les conditions qui font naître ou contribuent à perpétuer la discrimination interdite par le Pacte. Par exemple, dans les Etats où la situation générale de certains groupes de population empêche ou compromet leur jouissance des droits de l'homme, l'Etat doit prendre des mesures spéciales pour corriger cette situation. Ces mesures peuvent consister à accorder temporairement un traitement préférentiel dans des domaines spécifiques aux groupes en question par rapport au reste de la population. Cependant, tant que ces mesures sont nécessaires pour remédier à une discrimination de fait, il s'agit d'une différenciation légitime au regard du Pacte ».
Source : http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/...
Le Comité des droits de l'homme ajoute en 1995 (au sujet des États-Unis) : « The Committee emphasizes the need for the Government to increase its efforts to prevent and eliminate persisting discriminatory attitudes and prejudices against persons belonging to minority groups and women including, where appropriate, through the adoption of affirmative action. State legislation which is not yet in full compliance with the non-discrimination articles of the Covenant should be brought systematically into line with them as soon as possible ».
Source : http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/...
En droit canadien :
Voir l'art. 15(2) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés

En 1993, dans l'arrêt Weatherall c. Canada (Procureur général), la Cour suprême du Canada affirme :
« L'égalité, au sens du par. 15(1) de la Charte, n'implique pas nécessairement un traitement identique ; en fait, un traitement différent peut s'avérer nécessaire dans certains cas pour promouvoir l'égalité ».
Source : Weatherall c. Canada (Procureur général), [1993] 2 R.C.S. 872
En droit français :
La discrimination positive « est inscrite dans notre droit depuis 1789. L'action positive est donc inhérente aux valeurs de la République ».
Source : Yazid Sabeg et Laurence Méhaignerie, « Les oubliés de l'égalité des chances », Institut Montaigne, Rapport janvier 2004 à la p.99.
Source : Voir aussi le « Rapport public du Conseil d'Etat sur le principe d'égalité » (1996)
En éthique :
Martin Luther King, lauréat du prix nobel de la paix en 1964, était favorable à la discrimination positive. Je cite :
« Among the many vital jobs to be done, the nation must not only radically readjust its attitude toward the Negro in the compelling present, but must incorporate in its planning some compensatory consideration for the handicaps he has inherited from the past. It is impossible to create a formula for the future which does not take into account that our society has been doing something special against the Negro for hundreds of years. How then can he be absorbed into the mainstream of American life if we do not do something special for him now, in order to balance the equation and equipt him to compete on a just and equal basis ? Whenever this issue of compensatory or preferential treatment for the Negro is raised, some of our friends recoil in horror. The Negro should be granted equality, they agree ; but he should ask nothing more. On the surface, this appears reasonable, but it is not realistic. For it is obvious that if a man is entered at the starting line in a race three hundreds years after another man, the first would have to perform some impossible feat in order to catch up with his fellow runner »
Source : Martin Luther King, Why we can't wait, The New American Library, 1964 à la p.134.
Voir aussi les propos du sénateur Donald Oliver dans cet article du Globe and Mail « Senator who fought for employment equity defends Tories ».

Eric Folot

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  • Éric Folot Répondre

    4 septembre 2010

    En 2003, dans l'arrêt Grutter v. Bollinger, la juge Sandra Day O'Connor de la Cour suprême des États-Unis affirmait pour la majorité :
    « We find that the Law School's admissions program bears the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan. As Justice Powell made clear in Bakke, truly individualized consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical way. It follows from this mandate that universities cannot establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks. See id., at 315-316, 98 S.Ct. 2733. Nor can universities insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission. Ibid. Universities can, however, consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a “plus” factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and
    every applicant. » (Grutter v. Bollinger 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003)).
    En 2007, dans l'arrêt Ashoka Kumar Thakur Vs. Union of India and Ors, la Cour suprême de l'Inde affirmait :
    « According to some jurists, equality as a fundamental substantive norm is a characteristic feature of many democratic Constitutions. In societies that are diverse or in societies where certain groups of people were subjected to discrimination in the past subscription to the norm of equality necessitates an element of affirmative action. That may be the underlying object of Article 15. In India the "Varna" system of the early Vedic period was distorted and became a rigid and hierarchical caste system which resulted in lower castes being socially oppressed and economically exploited. Whatever be the truth in this plea, in the late 19th and early 20th century social reform movements started. An eminent jurist has noted that the equality provisions in the Indian Constitution were intended to be a pro-active means of social engineering and it is against this backdrop that the jurisprudence of reservations has developed in the Indian context. By contrast, the scenario in United States and South Africa can be looked at. The Constitution of US is older in point of time than that of Indian or South African Constitution. When it was initially adopted there was no mention of equality. The institution of slavery was legally sanctioned. It was only after the Civil War that the Thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution were enacted. The institution of slavery was abolished and "equal protection clause" came to be enacted. The "separate but equal doctrine" was sanctified by the decision of US Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson (163 US 537). But the formal equality was established in US after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education (347 US 483) and the Civil Rights Act, 1964. It is to be noted that in both the United States and South Africa, the past discrimination was along racial lines. This Court has in several instances focused on the question as to whether Articles 15(4) and 16(4) are a facet of equality or a derogation from it. Equality of opportunity is not simply a matter of legal equality. Its existence depends not merely on the absence of disabilities but on the presence of abilities. Where, therefore, there is inequality in fact, legal equality always tends to accentuate it. (See Dr. Pradeep Jain and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (1984 (3) SCC 654). In Indra Sawhney's case (supra) it appears that underlying principles which have been identified are the identification of class, which was held to be affirmative by using castes as a proxy. The State was Constitutionally empowered to enact affirmative action measures for backward classes. Differentiation or classifications for special preference must not be unduly unfair for the persons left out of the favoured groups » (Thakur v. Union of India [2007] RD-SC 609 (17 May 2007) à l'adresse : http://www.legalservicesindia.com/judgments/mar/case_29a_3_07.htm
    Eric Folot

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